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p stindustrialization and Congressional
c : ange: An Exploratory Mapping *
PAUL LENCHNER

East Texas State University

This paper is a modest attempt to shed some light on an enduring question: the relationship between social change and political life. The social
hange is postindustrialization. The aspect of political life is congressional
C
.
behavior. The corre 1at10ns
to be reported are not strong; thus the conclusions will be hedged and tentative. Nevertheless, we will argue that our objectives were at least partially realized.
Introduction: The Problem
A number of longterm, interrelated changes in American society have
led various observers to conclude that the United States has crossed the
threshold into the postindustrial era.' In postindustrial society one finds,
among other things, that the majority of the labor force is employed in service rather than manufacturing or extractive positions; that there is a particularly sharp increase in the proportion of the labor force employed in
health, education, research, and government; that the intelligentsia
becomesmore influential than ever before and the university becomes a central institution in society; and that there is a sharp increase in educational
attainments and income levels in the general public. 2 The prototypical
postindustrial worker has a postsecondary education, a well-paying whitecollar job, and a suburban residence. Daniel Bell, the leading authority on
the subject, cautions against a deterministic view of postindustrialization's
impact on politics. 3 Granting the wisdom of this advice, one need not be a
Marxist to agree that fundamental social transformations will inevitably
alter a country's politics. That assumption underlies our research.
The political parties/ electoral politics literature is suggestive of the
kinds of changes we are looking for. Numerous studies have documented
the emergence of a new breed of political activists.• Variously labeled
"amateurs," "purists," or "the new presidential elite," the new breed are
products of postindustrial society. They tend to be well-educated, well-off
professionals (or spouses of professionals) who become politically active to
promote a cause rather than to seek persona l power or material rewards.
Their influence has been especially apparent in presidential nominating
politics. In that arena conflict has intensified and become more focused on·
issues and ideologies, relatively extreme candidates are more likely to be
nominated, and the role of parties has been sharp ly reduced. As Everett
Carl Ladd and Charles Hadley observe, a new "dynamic" has taken hold in
•The author received an East Texas State University Faculty Research Grant in support of this research
•ffon. Jack Ballard provided skillful research assistance. A version of this paper was presented at the 1979
annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association .

pre idential politics. Traditional accommodationist politics has been
planted by the new, more conflictual po tindustrial variant.'
sup.
Where all this leaves Congress is a matter of some disagreement.
0
course, Congress is not an unchanging in titution. Recent years have
r
increased membership turnover, modifications in long-standi ng rule een
norm s, new structures and processes for handling the budget, and so
Yet a theme that runs through much of the literature (explicitly or implicit( ·
is that Con~r_esshas ~een rel~ti~ely unaffected by postindustrializat ion a:~
the new politic s associated with 1t. For example, Samuel Huntington argu
the persistence of provincialism in congressional politic .6 Morris Fiori:s
contends that the shrinking number of marginal seats in Congres is tha
result of members' ability to duck controversial issues while providing im~
proved case work and pork barrel benefits to const ituents. ' The consequence is that legislator s look more like old-time machine politician than
the vanguard of the postindustrial order.

fo;~

On the other hand, some analysts have called attention to congressional trends that are consistent with the notion of po stindustrialization.
David Mayhew suggests that despite the historic and continuing importance
of providing particularized benefits and then claiming credit for them in
members' reelection strategy, "credit claiming" may be giving way to
" position taking" (i.e., taking a stand on an issue, often a national one, of
concern to constituents). He states "t hat candidates running for Congress
have been relying increasingly on position taking; we now have talkshow
senators, a House rife with suburbanites, a huge and individualistic California
delegation, a reformed New York City delegation." ' It seems that for some
members the pork barrel is being overshadowed by the soap box. John
Saloma provides perhaps the most sweeping view of a postindustrial Congress. He predicts " a revolutionary change" in decision-making throughout
the government based upon the "applicati on of computer-based technology
and information systems. " 9 Saloma contends that the incrementalism
which has traditionally characterized congressional policy-making will be
superseded by more comprehensive approaches. In 1969 he wrote, "The
real change in congressional attitude and skills will probably not be felt,
however, until a new generation of political talent with practical experience
with computers-through
universities and the private sector-begins to
enter Congress. This change will come sooner than most realize."' 0
Perhaps by the mid-1970's its time had arrived.
Hypotheses, Data, and Methods
We anticipated that by the 94th Congress (1975-1976) the effects of
postindustrialization would be selectively evident in the behavior of United
States Representatives. Our expectation was that the more "postindustrial"
a member's district, the more likely he was to behave in ways consistent
with the descriptions of the new political activists by Wilson et al., and the
observation s on congressional change by Mayhew, Saloma, and others.
Specification of hypotheses, data, and methods follows.
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our general research design is hardly original. In diagrammatic form it
district
--------► member
characteristics
behavior.
dicators of district postindustrialization were readily available. Examples
1
~ t might have been used include aggregate measures of median family int ~e median school years completed, and percent white-collar workers.
~:t high correlations a_mong~any of the distri~t characteristics ar~ue~ for
parsimonious selection of independent variables. 11 After prelimmary
analysis, two were chosen: median family income in district, and district
~ype(urban, suburban, or rural). If the majority of a district's population
as urban, suburban, or rural, it was so labeled. 12 If none of the groups
~omprised a majority in it, it was labeled mixed and was excluded from
computations involving this variable. (Approximately one-sixth of the
districts were "mixed" under this classification.) Relatively wealthy
districtsand suburban districts were considered more "postindustrial" than
relativelypoor and urban or rural districts.
Three dependent variables were specified. The first was a member's
most important committee assignment. We hypothesized that members
from different kinds of districts would serve on different kinds of committees. (Underlying this expectation was the belief that committee assignments
wouldreflect committee requests ,and that those requests would be influenced
by district characteristics.) Drawing upon the work of Donald Matthews, 13
George Goodwin, u and others, House committees in the 94th Congress
were classified as follows:
Power committees (membership helps gain power within the House):
Appropriations, Rules, Ways and Means.
Issue committees (membership helps taking positions on national
issues): Armed Services, Banking, Currency and Housing, Budget,
Education and Labor, Government Operations, International Relations, Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Judiciary, Science and
Technology.
Pork barrel committees (membership helps secure specific benefits for
constituents or members): Agriculture, House Administration, Interior
and Insular Affairs, Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Public Works and
Transportation.
Other committees (membership is generally involuntary and members
leave as quickly as possible): District of Columbia, Post Office and
Civil Service, Small Business, Standards of Official Conduct,
Veterans' Affairs.
Taking each member's most important assignment, 15 we expected, for evident reasons, that members from postindustrial districts would be
disproportionately represented on issue committees, leaving members from
"less advanced" districts to be overrepresented on power and pork barrel
committees.
Our second measure of congressional behavior was the volume of
is:
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legislation each member introduced. 16 It is part of the postindustrial styl
be issue-oriented. We hypothesized the Representatives of the more P<>e_to
dustrial districts would feel a greater need to take positions on natttinissues than their colleagues. (It is assumed that all members feel a n~llal
~ake positions on _salient lo~~ issues.)_~ince i~tr~ducing l~gislation is a~
Jor way to establish a pos1t1on, prohf1cness m mtroducmg bills was con
sidered a sign of postindustrial behavior.
•
The third dependent variable was roll call consistency. Nominal'
politics in suburban, upper SES constituencies is likely to result in the
tion of issue-oriented candidates who will vote with ideological consistency
if they reach Congress." Voting consistency was measured through scores
compiled by the Americans for Constitutional Action. 11 ACA scores for
1975 and 1976 were averaged, and members with scores between Oand 15or
85 and 100 were considered to have consistent voting records. Members
whose scores averaged between 16 and 84 were considered to have relatively
inconsistent (or nonideological) voting records. 19 We expected the former to
be concentrated in the more postindustrial districts and the latter to be over.
represented in the poorer urban or rural districts.
The hypotheses were tested through crosstabulating independent and
dependent variables. For each pair of variables, their simple relationship
was computed first. Then the analysis was repeated controlling for party.
The results appear in the next section.

sel'::
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Resu;:ble1 crosstabulates

district median family income with member's
t important committee assignment. A clear pattern appeared . As the
ict's wealth increased, so did the likelihood that its Representative's
dis; iJl1portantcommittee assignment was on a panel oriented toward national
~o es For all members and within each party 's delegation the relationship
,ssu ~tatistically significant, and with a minor deviation among the
;~ublicans it was monotonic. While the correlations were modest, exa:Unation of the percentages was at least moderately encouraging.

~ot

TABLE 1
Median Fa~ily Income and Most Important Commiuee
A. All Members
Median Family Income in District

Most Imponant Commineea
Power6

tssuec

$0-7,999
31% (31)
44% (44)
26% (26)
IOl'loe(l01)

Pork barreld
Total
X' = 31.271, 6 d .f., p<.001 ; Cramer's V = .19

$8,000-9,999
22'1, (35)
490/o (76)
290/o (45)
100% (156)

SI0,000-11,999
24% (28)
68% (81)
8% (IO)
1000/o (119)

$12,000 +
22'1, (13)
69'1, (41)
99% (59)

Total
107
242
86
435

$12,000 +
27% (8)
670/o (20)

Total
74
162

~

B. Democrats
Median Family Income in District

Most ImportantCommiuec
Power

$0-7 ,999
30% (23)
47'1, (36)
23'1, (18)
1000/o(77)

Is.sue
Pork barrel
Total
X' = 31.193, 6d.f., p< .05; Cramer's V

=

$8,000-9,999
22'1o (23)
52'1o (55)
26'1o (27)
IOO'lo(105)

SI0,000-11,99.9
250/o (20)
65'1o (51)
IO'lo (8)
1000/o(79)

-2!!.QL

55

IOIO/o(30)

291

$10,000-11 ,999
200/,(8)
750/o (30)

$12,000+
170/o(5)
720/o (21)

~

~

Total
33
80
31
144

. 15

C. Republicans
Median Family Income in District

Most Important Committee
Power
Issue
Pork barrel
Total

S0-7,999
330/o (8)
330/o (8)
33'1, (8)
990/o (24)

$8,000-9,999
240/, ( 12)
41'1, (2 1)
350/, (18)
1000/o(51)

1000/o(40)

990/o (29)

X' = 22.742, 6 d.f., p<.001; Cramer's V = .28
:Excluding the one member who did not serve on a power, issue, or pork barrel committee.

Appropriations, Rules. Ways and Means.
C:Armcd
Services, Banking, Currencyand Housing, Budget, Educationand Labor. GovernmentOperations,International
dRcl~tions,Interstateand Foreign Commerce, Judiciary. Science and Technology.
Agr1cuhurc, House Administration, Interior and Insular Affairs, Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Public Works and
Transportation
.
t-rotalsmay not sum to 100'7, due to rounding.

5

Table 2 reports the relationship between median family income
volume of legislation introduced. The uncontrolled findings were as and
pected. Only 24 percent of legislators from the poorest districts introdu:
at least 200 bills. In contrast, 54 percent of the members from the wealthi
districts introduced 200 or more bills. In the Democratic districts the Patteest
was even clearer. Twenty-two percent of Democrats from the POor;:1
districts introduced 200 or more bills, while 67 percent of their fellow Parti~
from the best-off districts introduced at least 200 bills. For the Republicans
the differences were inconsistent and not statistically significant.
TABLE 2
Median Family Income and Bills Introduced
A . AU Members
Med;an Family Income in District
Number of Bills Introduced
0-99
100-199
200-299
300 +
Total

S0-7,999
32% (33)
44% (45)
10% (10)
14% (14)
1000/o(102)

X' = 31.225, 9 d.f., p<.001; gamma

$8,000-9,999
260/o (41)
420/o (66)
190/o(30)
120/o(19)
99% (156)

SI0,000-11,999
16% (19)
36% (43)
26% (31)
230/o (27)
1010/o(120)

$12,000+
8% (5)
38% (23)
32% (19)
220/o (13)

Total

98
177
90
73

100%(60) 438

= .28

8 . Democrats
Median Family Income in District
Number of Bills Introduced
0-99
100-199
200-299
300 +
Total

X'

= 38.789,

$0-7,999
360/o (28)
42% (33)
5% (4)
17% (13)
100% (78)

9 d.f., p<.001; gamma

=

$8,000-9;999
240/o (25)
380/o (40)
210/o (22)
16% (17)
99% (104)

SI0,000-11 ,999
140/o(11)
30% (24)
25% (20)
31% (25)
100% (80)

$12,000+
00/o (0)
320/o (10)
320/o (10)
350/o (11)
99% (3 1)

Total
64
107

56

~
293

.37
C. Republican s
Median Family Income in District

Number of Bills Introduced
0-99
100-199
200-299
300 +
Total
not significant; gamma

=

$0-7,999
21 % (5)
500/o (12)
250/o (6)
4% (I)
1000/o(24)

$8,000-9,999
31% (16)
500/o (26)
15% (8)

SI0,000-11,999
20% (8)
480/o (19)
280/o (11)

~

~

1000/o(52)

.14

6

101% (40)

$12,000+
170/o(5)
450/o (13)
31% (9)

Total
34
70
34
_____?__'!!__QL1
1000/o(29)
145

In Table 3 the median family income data are crosstabulated with the
CA scores of the members. The uncontrolled findings met our expectation
:at Representa tives with the most consistent voting records (i.e., extreme
t CA scores) would be disproportionately from the wealthier districts.
11though the relati?nship was statistically significant, it was neither
onotonic nor especially strong. When party was controlled, the data came
~to much sharper focus. For the Democrats the relationship was as
1
redicted and was stronger than any other encountered up to this point
amma == .49). While 71 percent of the Democrats from the poorest
!strict s had moderate ACA scores, an identical percentage from the two
wealthiest district categories had extreme scores. For the Republicans the
findings ran contrary to expectation. District income and voting consistency
were inversely related, and the negative correlation was fairly strong (gamma

r

== - .39).
TABLE 3
Median Family Income and ACA Sco re
A. All Members

Median Family lncomt in Dist rict
CA Score"
Moderate 6
Extreme<
Total

S0-7.999
63'1, (62)
3711/,(37)
100'1, (99)

$8.000-9.999
55'1, (83)
45'1, (68)
100'1, (151)

SI0.000-11.999
430/o (50)
57'1, (67)
100'1, ( 117)

$12.000+
5 1'1, (30)
490/o (29)
1000/o (59)

Total

225
201
426

X' • 8.967. 3 d .f.. p <. 05; gamma • . 19
B. Democrats

Median Family lncomt in District
ACA Score

Moderate
EJ;trcmc

Total

S0-7.999
7 10/o (53)
29'1, (22)
1000/o (75)

X' • 32.343, 3 d .f., p < .001 ; gamma

$8.000-9.999
55'1, (55)
4511/,(45)
100'1, ( 100)

S I0.000-1 1,999
29'1, (23)
7 1'I, (55)
100'1, (78)

$ 12,000 +
29'1, (9)
7 111/,(22)
1000/o (3 1)

Tota l
140
144
284

= .49
C. Republicans
Medi an Family Income in Dist rict

ACA Score
Madera«

Extreme
Total

$0-7,999
38'1, (9)
63'1, ( 15)
1010/o (2A)

$8,000-9,999
55'1, (28)
45"• (23)
1000/o (5 1)

$10,000- 11,999
6911/,(27)
31'1, (12)
100'1, (39)

$ 12,000+
7511/,(21)
250/o (7)

Total

100'1, (28)

142

X' • 9.612 , 3 d .f., p <. 05; gamma • - .39
:A-..eragc scores for 1975 and 1976 . Representatives who were not members bot h years were excluded .
A"cragc score between 16 and 84.
CAvcragcsco re bttwecn O and 14 or 85 and 100 .

7

85

51

In Table 4 we turn to the correlates of the urban, subur ban , or ru
character of a district. This table crosstabulates district type and member~
most important committee assignment. The findings for all members ~ ;
the Democrats alone were as hypothesized. Suburban legislators were mo
likely than their urban or rural colleagues to sit on an issue committee
less likely to sit on a power or pork ban;el committee. Among th
Republicans a statistically significant relationship was found but not thc
?ne anticip~ted. Urban members of the GOP were most likely to sit on~
issue committee.

a::

TABLE 4a
District Type and Most Important

Committee

A . All Member s

District Type/)
Most Important

Committee

Power
Issue
Pork barrel
Total

X' = 31.583, 4 d.f., p<.001;

Urbane

Suburband

Rurale

2711/o(29)
6111/o(65)
1111/o(12)

2011/o(25)
690Jo (86)
IOOJo(13)

2311/o(30)
440Jo (57)
340Jo (44)

9911/o(106)

99% (124)

IOlll/o(l31)

Cramer's

Total

84
208

~
361

V = .21

B. Democrats
District Type
Most Important

Committee

Power
Issue
Pork barrel

Urban

Suburban

290Jo (26)
580Jo (52)
12% (II)
9911/o(89)

Total

X' = 19.7 51, 4 d.f., p< .001 ; Cramer's

Rural

Total

2011/o(14)
7111/o(50)
911/o(6)

2311/o(18)
450Jo (35)
320Jo (25)

58
137
42

100% (70)

IOOOJo(78)

237

V = .20
C. Republican s

District Type
Most Important
Power
Issue
Pork barrel
Total

Committee

Urban

Suburban

Rural

Total

180Jo (3)
7611/o(13)
60Jo (I)

200Jo (11)
670Jo (36)
130Jo (7)

230Jo (12)
420Jo (22)
360Jo (19)

26
71
27

IOOOJo(17)

10011/o(54)

IOI 11/o(53)

124

X' = 13. 115, 4 d.f., p< .05; Cramer's V = .23
asee notes to Table I.
bDistricts without a majority of urban, suburban or rural residents were excluded .
CMajority of residents reside in central city(ies) of SMSA(s) .
dMajority of residents reside in SMSA(s) but outside central city(ies).
eMajority of residents live outside SMSA(s).
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Table 5 correlates district type and volume of legislation introduced.
We expected that suburban members would be more prolific in introducing
biJlsthan urban or rural Representatives. The results were otherwise. The
ncontrolled data as well as those for the Democrats alone showed that ur~an members introduced the most bills followed by the suburbanites. The
ural members trailed by a substantial margin. A statistically significant
r lationship was found, but this resulted primarily from differences be~:een metropolitan (i.e., urban and suburban) and nonmetropolitan
members. Once again the Republicans confounded expectation. District
type was not related to volume of legislation introduced in the GOP.
TABLE 5a
District Type and Bills Introduced

A . All Members

District Type
Number of bills Introduced

Urban

Suburban
170/o (22)
370/o (47)
26"1o (33)
190/o (24)
990/o (126)

160/o (17)
0-99
33"1, (35)
100-199
150/o (16)
200-299
360/o (38)
300 +
1000/o (106)
Total
X' = 45.521, 6 d .f. , p< .001; Cramer's V
.25

Rural
320/o (42)
47"1, (62)
160/o (21)
50/o (7)
1000/o (132)

Total
81
144
70
69
364

=

B. Democrats

District Type
Suburban
130/o (9)
32"1• (23)
270/o (19)
280/o (20)
1000/o (71)

Urban
150/o (13)
290/o (26)
150/o (13)
42"1o (37)

Number of Bills Introduced
0-99
100-199
200-299
300 +
Total

1010/o (89)

X' = 39.451, 6 d.f., p<.001;

Cramer's

Rural
350/o (28)
460/o (36)
110/o (9)
80/o (6)
100"1• (79)

Total
50
85
41
63
239

V = .29
C . Republicans

District Type
Number of Bills Introduced
0-99
100-199
200-2 99
300 +
Total
not significant; Cramer's
8 Scc notes to Table 4 .

Urban
240/o (4)
530/o (9)
180/o (3)
60/o (1)
1010/o (17)

Suburban
240/o (13)
440/o (23)
250/o (14)
7"1• (4)
1000/o (55)

V = . IO

9

Rural
260/o (14)
490/o (26)
230/o (12)
20/o (1)
1000/o (53)

Total
31
59
29
6
125

Finally, Table 6 cro sstabula tes distr ict type with ACA scores. The dat
are somewhat similar to Table 5. Here, too, a significant relati on ship a a
peared in the uncontrolled findings although the urban mem bers
behaved a bit more "postindus trially" than the suburbanites . But thn
results were clarified when party was controlled. Among the Democrats e
moderatel y strong relation ship was found (Cramer 's V = .34). Subur~
bani tes were marg inall y more ideological than urbanites , and bo th group
were much mo re con sistent in voting than the rural members. In contrast s
among the Republicans district type was unrelated to roll call con sistency'.

agai

TABLE 6a
District Type and ACA Score
A. All Members

Distric t Type
ACA Score
Moderate
Extreme
To1al
X'

= 12.764,

Urban
40 "lo (42)
60 "10 (62)
lOO"lo(104)
2 d .f., p <. 01; Cramer 's V

Suburban
49"lo (60)
51"lo (63)
lOO"lo(123)

Rural
63"lo (80)
37"lo (46)
lOO"lo(126)

Total
182

Rural
72"lo (53)
28"lo (21)
IOO"lo(74)

To1al
109
122
231

Tolal

171
353

= . 19
B. Democrat s

District Type
ACA Scor e
Moderate
Extreme
To1al

Urban
37"lo (32)
63"lo (55)
IOO"lo(87)

X' = 26 . 184, 2 d .f., p < .001 ; Cramer's

Suburban
34"lo (24)
66"10(46)
IOO"lo(70)

V = .34
C . Republicans

District Type
ACA Score
Moderate
Extreme
Total

59% (10)
4 1"lo (7)

Suburban
68"10 (36)
32"lo (17)

Rural
52"lo (27)
48"lo (25)

IOO"lo(17)

IOO"lo(53)

lOO"lo(52)

Urban

73
49
122

not significam ; Cramer 's V = . 15
a5ec notes 10 Table s 3 and 4.

Discussion
The findings prompted neither joy nor despair. Broadly speaking, our
hypotheses were confirmed, but the relationships (though statistically ·
significant) tended to be modest. Controlling for party showed that
Democrats were more likely to conform to expectation than Republicans. In
the following discussion we will first offer some suggestions why the results
were not more positive and then comment on the implicatio ns of what was
found .
10

Had we not been forced to treat constituencies as undifferentiated
hOles, our findings might have been more positive. Richard Fenno 20 and
~orri s Fiorina 21 are among those who have written of the need to make inconstituency distinctions (e.g., between a member's supporters and nontr~porters) when analyzing member-constituency linkages. This is sound
s~vice; only the unavailability of suitable data kept us from following it.
a Data limitations may have attenuated the relationships found in
nother way. Obviously, our research design is elliptical. District
aharacteristics do not directly determine member behavior. Rather, certain
~ypesof districts tend to elect Representatives with particular attitudes who
in turn behave in particular ways. Diagrammatically:
District
-------e► member ------► member
characteristics
attitudes
► behavior.
Ideally, interviews would have been conducted to classify members according to the degree of "postindustrialness" in their attitudes. 22 In the absence
of interview data, member's education was used as a surrogate (under the
assumption that members with advanced educations would be more likely
than their less educated colleagues to have attitudes that would lead to
postindustrial behavior patterns). But the attempt to correlate member's
education with behavior did not prove fruitful, and the research design was
kept in the simpler form reported earlier. 23
Finally and most broadly, it is possible that our problem is not operationalization but conceptualization. Perhaps it is the very concept of postindu trialization and the postindustrial ociety that is flawed. While we do
not accept this view, its proponents' arguments deserve some attention. Bell
is charged with reading too much into demographic changes in society. For
example, Peter Stearns 2 ' and Krishan Kumar 25 contend that Bell overstates
the import of professionalization in the work force. Kumar notes that many
people now in "professional" positions, such as teachers, social workers,
and technical staff personnel, perform routine tasks and are increasingly
subject to pressures from bureaucracies over which they have no control.
Along with this "proletariatization" of the white-collar labor force has
come a rise in unionization and strikes. Analogous claims could be made
about the spread of higher education. Reduced entrance and graduation requirements and grade inflation have cheapened the value of holding a
degree, even a graduate degree. And increases in income have been fighting
a losing battle with inflation for several years. Thus, there may be less to
postindustrialization than meets the eye, and, in any case, the progression
to postindustrial society is not necessarily linear.
Bell is also charged with underestimating the continuities between
politics in the industrial era and politics in the forthcoming period. Richard
Hall,26 Michael Harrington, 21 and others argue that corporate power has
been and will continue to be the crucial determinant of American public
policy, Consistent with the downplaying of demographic changes, these
critics expect postindustrial politics to be a continuation of familiar pat11

terns. In the words of one: "the politics of the 'postind ustrial' society Will
be the politics of the industrial society-only, as it were, writ large. "21
111
short, fault has been found both with the notion of postindus trial change.
society and with the view that political life is being altered in consequcn~
ways. Perhaps this is why our hypotheses received less than overwhehnina
support.
Turning positive, our most noteworthy finding was that significant dif.
ferences existed in the behavior of Representatives that were associated With
the degree of postindustrialization in their districts. Assuming that mor
districts will take on postindustrial characteristics with the passage of timce
even if the progression in each district is not linear, what does this suggcs;
about future congr essional politics? Extrapolating from the findings
(which always involves some risk), it appears that future Congresses willbe
marked by increased concern for national issues and sharper ideologicaJ
conflict, but not necessarily more productivity. This picture is quite consistent with previous discussions of postindustrial politics.
Most analysts of postindustrial society, including Bell, are not op.
timistic about its politics. The dominant view is that politi cs will be more
important with government being called upon to resolve more conflicts, but
consensus will be harder to achieve.1 ' According to Bell, "A postindustrial
society ... is increasingly a communal society wherein public mechanisms
rather than the market become the allocators of goods, and public choice,
rather than individual demand, becomes the arbiter of services. " J 0 Among
the causes of this situation are the proliferation of groups making claims on
the community, increased concern with the impact of privat e actions on the
public welfare, and continuing demands for better educati on and health.
Political institutions are expected to encounter maj or difficulties in
responding to the heightened demands made of them. One reason is that
demands are now frequently made for broad, hard-to-meas ure policies. For
example, when government is asked to provide "educatio nal experiences
that enhance creativity," · it is hard enough to agree on what is desired,let
alone how to get there. J , A second problem is financial. The rising demands
on the polity will inevitably sharpen conflict for public sector resources.11
With this strain on the public treasury demands by some will be perceivedas
threatening the benefits of others more so than in the past. In terms of
Theodore Lowi's typology, demands will increasingly be for redistributive
policies, and redistributive policy-making characteristically involves sharp,
protracted, ideological conflict. n A final, related problem is the possibility
of stalemate and frustration. In the overcrowded political arena, particular
interests (or coalitions of interests) may have the strength to veto the claims
of other interests, but not enough strength to realize their own aims.,.
Our data are in line with this interpretation. The volume of legislation
introduced by Representatives of the more postindustrial districts, as wellas
their committee assignments, seems reflective of the members' desire to respond to the heightened expectations of their constituents. At the same
12

·me their extreme voting records (with Democrats and Republicans
t~ust~ringat opposite poles) suggest they will not have an easy time reaching
~e compromises that are normally necessary for action. An observation of
tvfayhew captures well the situation we are describing:
over all it may just be true that the level of [vote] mobilization activity in Congress is declining. Electoral demand for position taking
seems to be on the rise. In the House taciturn machine congressmen are being replaced by voluble city reformers and suburbanites. City and state blocs once maneuverable for logrolling purposes are crumbling. For a member with a reasonably alert
middle-class constituency the best course is probably to register an
elaborate set of pleasing positions, a course that reduces the
changes of vote trading. 35
Before offering some concluding comments, a few words are in order
about the interparty differences in behavior that were found. In five of the
six tables the Democrats' behavior was more congruent with expectations
than the Republicans.' In each Democratic table a statistica lly significant
relationship was found which was consistent (to a greater or lesser degree)
with our hypothesis. On the other hand, only three statistically significant
relationships were found among the Republicans, and one of these ran
precisely counter to expectation. In short, postindustrialization in the
districts clearly had more impact on the behavior of Democrats than
Republicans. 36
These findings bring to mind Samuel Lubell's classic discussion of
political parties in the New Deal and immediate post-New Deal periods. 37
Lubell's argument, which has more recently been amplified and updated by
Everett Carll Ladd 31 and Richard Rubin, 39 is that the majority Democrats
are the more vital party-"the
party of the agenda" in Ladd's phrase.4° In
consequence, major societal trends are reflected in their ranks while the
minority Republicans linger behind, reacting belatedly to the forces of
social change. From this perspective it was not surprising that intraparty
differences were sharper among the Democrats and that Democrats were
more "responsive" than Republicans to constituency indicators of postindustrialization.
Conclusion

Earlier some contrasting views about the relative import of continuity
and change in congressional politics were presented. As is customary, we
probably exaggerate d the differences in the opposing viewpoints. As is also
customary, we shall now suggest that reality lies somewhere between the extremes. We do hope, however, that our synthesis is not as trite as the
framework in which it appears.
Judging from our data and other sources, today's Representative differs in noteworthy ways from his predecessors. Members are more concerned with developing and taking positions on national issues, and their style is
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more ideological. These changes are associated, especially among
Democrats, with indicators of postindustrialization in the constit utencies.
This in turn suggests that more members will behave "postindust rially" as
the United States becomes more fully a postindustrial society.
Yet members can hardly afford to neglect their districts. On the contrary, Fiorina makes a good case that it is improved constituency service
that is at the root of the extraordinary reelection rate of House members in
recent years . 41 What we seem to have, then, is not a new politics replacing
the traditional congressional ways, but rather some new (or expanded) patterns being overlaid upon the established ones. It is not the soap box replacing the pork barrel but rather the soap box being perched on to p o f the pork
barrel. Members now feel compelled not only to secure tangi ble benefits for
their constituents but also to take a prominent role in developing and
publicizing policies to deal with national problems.
In a 1978 column Tom Wicker made two seemingly con tradictory
observations about Congress. With specific reference to tra de and tariff
legislation, he pointed out that "logrolling, old stuff in Con gress," has
become even more prevalent recently. At the same time he qu oted (and indicated his agreement with) the comment of Jimmy Carter's legislative aide
Frank Moore that "it ' s practically impossible to put together a coal ition for
something anymore.'" 2 One might surmise that logrolling an d coalitionbuilding go hand-in-hand. The catch, of course, is that differe nt types of
issues are involved. It appears that in the face of escalating demands on
both narrow and general issues legislators are as adept as ever (perhaps
more so) in logrolling on the narrow ones but are encounteri ng great difficulties in building coalitions on the broad ones.
So today's Congress is an amalgam of old and new. If ree lection rates
are a valid indicator, Representatives have responded more than adequately
to the increasing demands made of them . But reelection rates do not tell the
whole story. There is also the rise in voluntary retirements and the comments by veteran members that congressional life is not as enj oyable as it
used to be. 0 Apparently being a master of both the pork barre l an d the soap
box is extremely taxing and often frustrating. Postindustrializ ation has
meant that "virtually everything has been politicized, organize d and computerized ..... And that, for Congress, has been a decidedly mixe d blessing.
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